Wired Equivalent Privacy - Wikipedia. Wired Equivalent Privacy (WEP) is a security algorithm for IEEE 8. Kenmore Elite Front Load Washer Repair Manual.
Introduced as part of the original 8. In 2. 00. 4, with the ratification of the full 8. WPA2), the IEEE declared that both WEP- 4. WEP- 1. 04 have been deprecated. At the time that the original WEP standard was drafted, the U.
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S. Government's export restrictions on cryptographic technology limited the key size. Once the restrictions were lifted, manufacturers of access points implemented an extended 1.
WEP protocol using a 1. WEP- 1. 04). A 6. WEP key is usually entered as a string of 1.
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Standard 64-bit WEP uses a 40 bit key (also known as WEP-40), which is concatenated with a 24-bit initialization vector (IV) to form the RC4 key.
A–F). Each character represents 4 bits, 1. IV produces the complete 6. WEP key (4 bits . Most devices also allow the user to enter the key as 5 ASCII characters (0–9, a–z, A–Z), each of which is turned into 8 bits using the character's byte value in ASCII (8 bits .
IV produces the complete 1. WEP key (4 bits . Most devices also allow the user to enter it as 1. ASCII characters (8 bits . As with the other WEP variants, 2. IV, leaving 1. 28 or 2.
These 1. 28 or 2. Most devices also allow the user to enter it as 1. ASCII characters (8 bits .
The discussion applies to the ad hoc mode as well. In Open System authentication, the WLAN client need not provide its credentials to the Access Point during authentication. Any client can authenticate with the Access Point and then attempt to associate. In effect, no authentication occurs. Subsequently, WEP keys can be used for encrypting data frames. At this point, the client must have the correct keys.
In Shared Key authentication, the WEP key is used for authentication in a four- step challenge- response handshake: The client sends an authentication request to the Access Point. The Access Point replies with a clear- text challenge. The client encrypts the challenge- text using the configured WEP key and sends it back in another authentication request. The Access Point decrypts the response. If this matches the challenge text, the Access Point sends back a positive reply. After the authentication and association, the pre- shared WEP key is also used for encrypting the data frames using RC4. At first glance, it might seem as though Shared Key authentication is more secure than Open System authentication, since the latter offers no real authentication.
However, it is quite the reverse. It is possible to derive the keystream used for the handshake by capturing the challenge frames in Shared Key authentication. If privacy is a primary concern, it is more advisable to use Open System authentication for WEP authentication, rather than Shared Key authentication; however, this also means that any WLAN client can connect to the AP. The purpose of an IV, which is transmitted as plain text, is to prevent any repetition, but a 2. IV is not long enough to ensure this on a busy network. The way the IV was used also opened WEP to a related key attack. For a 2. 4- bit IV, there is a 5.
IV will repeat after 5. In August 2. 00. 1, Scott Fluhrer, Itsik Mantin, and Adi Shamir published a cryptanalysis of WEP that exploits the way the RC4 ciphers and IV are used in WEP, resulting in a passive attack that can recover the RC4 key after eavesdropping on the network.
Depending on the amount of network traffic, and thus the number of packets available for inspection, a successful key recovery could take as little as one minute. If an insufficient number of packets are being sent, there are ways for an attacker to send packets on the network and thereby stimulate reply packets which can then be inspected to find the key. The attack was soon implemented, and automated tools have since been released.
It is possible to perform the attack with a personal computer, off- the- shelf hardware and freely available software such as aircrack- ng to crack any WEP key in minutes. Cam- Winget et al.
They write . Federal Bureau of Investigation gave a demonstration where they cracked a WEP- protected network in 3 minutes using publicly available tools. Klein showed that there are more correlations between the RC4 keystream and the key than the ones found by Fluhrer, Mantin and Shamir which can additionally be used to break WEP in WEP- like usage modes. In 2. 00. 6, Bittau, Handley, and Lackey showed. After eavesdropping a single packet, an attacker can rapidly bootstrap to be able to transmit arbitrary data. The eavesdropped packet can then be decrypted one byte at a time (by transmitting about 1. IP addresses. Finally, if the 8.
Internet, the attacker can use 8. IP header onto them. The access point can then be used to decrypt these packets and relay them on to a buddy on the Internet, allowing real- time decryption of WEP traffic within a minute of eavesdropping the first packet. In 2. 00. 7, Erik Tews, Andrei Pychkine, and Ralf- Philipp Weinmann were able to extend Klein's 2. WEP. With the new attack it is possible to recover a 1.
WEP key with probability 5. For 6. 0,0. 00 available data packets, the success probability is about 8. Using active techniques like deauth and ARP re- injection, 4. The actual computation takes about 3 seconds and 3 MB of main memory on a Pentium- M 1.
GHz and can additionally be optimized for devices with slower CPUs. The same attack can be used for 4. In 2. 00. 8, Payment Card Industry (PCI) Security Standards Council’s latest update of the Data Security Standard (DSS), prohibits use of the WEP as part of any credit- card processing after 3. June 2. 01. 0, and prohibits any new system from being installed that uses WEP after 3. March 2. 00. 9. The use of WEP contributed to the T. J. Maxx parent company network invasion.
IPSec, Secure Shell) can provide secure data transmission over an insecure network. However, replacements for WEP have been developed with the goal of restoring security to the wireless network itself. WPA and WPA2). WPA was an intermediate solution for hardware that could not support WPA2. Both WPA and WPA2 are much more secure than WEP. WPA was designed as an interim software- implementable solution for WEP that could forestall immediate deployment of new hardware. It was implementable on some (not all) hardware not able to handle WPA or WPA2, and extended both the IV and the key values to 1.
The two extended key lengths remained in what eventually became WPA's TKIP. WEPplus. As this cannot easily be enforced, it remains a serious limitation. It also does not necessarily prevent replay attacks, and is ineffective against later statistical attacks that do not rely on weak IVs. Dynamic WEP changes WEP keys dynamically. It is a vendor- specific feature provided by several vendors such as 3.
Com. The dynamic change idea made it into 8. TKIP, but not for the actual WEP algorithm.